





From Machine Ethics to Computational Ethics 
 
 Samuel T. Segun1   
 
Abstract  
Research into the ethics of artificial intelligence is often categorized into two subareas – robot ethics and 
machine ethics. Many of the definitions and classifications of the subject matter of these subfields, as 
found in the literature, are conflated, which I seek to rectify. In this essay, I infer that using the term 
‘machine ethics’ is too broad and glosses over issues that the term computational ethics best describes. I 
show that the subject of inquiry of computational ethics is of great value and indeed is an important 
frontier in developing ethical artificial intelligence systems (AIS). I also show that computational is a 
distinct, often neglected field in the ethics of AI. In contrast to much of the literature, I argue that the 
appellation ‘machine ethics’ does not sufficiently capture the entire project of embedding ethics into AI/S 
and hence the need for computational ethics. This essay is unique for two reasons; first, it offers a 
philosophical analysis of the subject of computational ethics that is not found in the literature. Second, it 
offers a finely grained analysis that shows the thematic distinction among robot ethics, machine ethics and 
computational ethics.  
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What really is computational ethics? In this essay, I not only answer the question of what computational 
ethics involves but also show explicitly why it constitutes an important frontier in the development of 
artificial intelligence systems (AIS) that are sensitive to human values. Unlike what is frequently found in 
the literature, I argue that the tag ‘computational ethics’ offers a plausible description of the project of 
embedding ethics into artificial intelligence systems, one that other commonly used appellations such as 
‘machine morality’, ‘friendly AI’ and especially ‘machine ethics’ are too broad to convey. I offer 
justifications for this claim, showing how moral philosophers and indeed AI ethicists can approach and 
further develop computational ethics in praxis and as a transdisciplinary project.  
As the hype around artificial intelligence increases and more AIS are built, the ethical burden these 
systems bring become apparent. Discourses around the ethical and moral implications of artificial 
intelligence are usually addressed under the auspices of the ethics of artificial intelligence (Russell, Hauert, 
Altman and Veloso 2015). Among the earliest works that motivated the formation of the ethics of AI, 
Isaac Asimov’s works stand out. Asimov, in his fictional texts, showed us that developing intelligent robots 
without some form of moral code could be catastrophic (Clarke 1993; 1994). Perhaps his most notable 
contribution to the discipline was the formulation of the three laws of robotics2 (Asimov 1950), which 
have since then motivated discussions around the possibility of having intelligent systems that are 
responsive to human ethics. Analysing Asimov’s three laws of robotics show the problems of formulating 
guidelines for building ethical autonomous intelligent systems3.  
                                                          
2 As is well known, Asimov’s three laws of robotics are as follows: 1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through 
inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. 2. A robot must obey orders given it by human beings except where such 
orders would conflict with the First Law. 3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not 
conflict with the First or Second Law. The fourth law, which is also referred to as the zeroth law states that a robot may 
not harm humanity, or, by inaction, allow humanity to come to harm. 
 
3 Clarke identifies certain constraints to Asimov’s laws of robotics, which would make it computationally difficult to 
implement. These are the ambiguity and cultural dependence of terms used in the formulation of the laws; the role of 
judgment in decision-making, which would be quite tricky to implement given the degree of programming required in 
decision-making; the sheer complexity, this also bothers on having to account for all possible scenarios; the scope for 






Generally, the ethics of AI focuses on the socio-economic4 (Smith & Anderson, 2014) and legal 
impact5 (Chopra & White, 2011) of AI and the moral and ethical issues (Bostrom, 2003) surrounding the 
use of these systems. Although research into the ethics of AI is often categorized into two subareas, robot 
ethics and machine ethics, many of the themes of these two subfields, as found in the literature, conflates. 
I address these subareas extensively in the next section, classifying the themes that make up these sub-
disciplines as distinct from each other. I in no way adduce that previous classifications of robot and 
machine ethics are wrong; rather, I infer and confirm that these two subareas are not as identical as they 
first appeared during the development phase of the discipline – ethics of AI.  
My goal in this article is two-pronged. First, I intend to show the distinction between the two 
seemingly identical subareas of the ethics of AI. Second, I make a case for why it is reasonable to look 
beyond machine ethics to computational ethics. Although this may fit in as a technical piece, I take for 
granted that readers are aware of what some less technical terms mean, such as artificial intelligence and 
autonomous intelligent systems. In places where I have referred to technical terms, I offer brief definitions 
to put them in context.  
I have structured this work into four sections. In the first, I show the thematic distinction between 
robot ethics and machine ethics. Second, I offer firm justifications as to why it is reasonable to now move 
to the more practical and concrete subfield of computational ethics. Third, I show contrasts and overlaps 
among these fields. Fourth, I make a case for why computational ethics is an important frontier in our 
pursuit to have artificial intelligence systems that are responsive and sensitive to human values and ethics.  
 
                                                          
4 Smith & Anderson in the 2014 published Pew Research titled “AI, Robotics, and the Future of Jobs”, discuss the 
economic and social impact of AI on society. As we continue to build more autonomous intelligent systems, we are likely 
to delegate responsibilities around security, environment, healthcare, food production etc. to these systems. These all raise 
concerns about the impact of AI on jobs and society.   
 
5 Closely linked to the moral issue with AI is the debate around its legal status, agency, and responsibility. With the 
imminent disruption in the transport sector by the introduction of self-driving cars, questions around who bears 
responsibility for harm caused by a self-driving car comes to mind. Also, there are more technical questions around 






1. From Robot Ethics To Machine Ethics  
In this section, I will show the divergence between the primary concerns of robot ethics and those of the 
field commonly known as ‘machine ethics’. The purpose here is to lay the groundwork and show the 
distinction and logical relation among all subfields of the ethics of AI. As Wallach and Asaro (2017) note, 
“there is no firm distinction between robot ethics and machine ethics, and some scholars treat machine 
ethics as a subset of robot ethics” (2). It becomes expedient to carry out this type of conceptual work, 
giving an analytic distinction between these two oft-conflated fields. This is because as the field – ethics of 
AI – becomes more popular, taxonomic description of works done within these subfields become 
necessary to takes away the ambiguity that arises from conflating these fields.  
 
1.1. Robot Ethics 
Robots, as commonly used today could mean one of the following: a mechanical device, an automated 
device, an electronic device, a computer program, a cybernetic device, and an artificial intelligence system. 
The last meaning, robots as artificial intelligence systems, is the meaning most commonly used in robot 
ethics. As Lin defines it, “A robot is a machine, situated in the world, that senses, thinks, and acts” (Lin et 
al 2012, 18). 
Robots, as used in robot ethics, refers to autonomous intelligent systems capable of carrying out 
complex actions that may have impact or consequences on humans or other morally significant beings. 
These systems may include humanoid assistive robots, self-driving cars, and other autonomous computer 
programmes that interact with systems or users on the internet (Allen, Varner, and Zinser 2000; Turkle 
2006; Vallor 2011).  
As an evolving subject of inquiry, robot ethics, also known as ‘roboethics’, focuses on how 
development in robotics research will affect ethical and social interaction. Furthermore, it addresses “what 






treated (Veruggio & Operto 2006). These concerns are meant to influence how we design and engage with 
these systems.  
For this section, I have mapped out three thematic areas robot ethics is most concerned with 
which I will discuss extensively later in the section. These are one, ensuring that the design process, 
creation, and purpose of artificial intelligence systems are ethical; two, issues of rights and the duties of 
humans toward robots and vice versa. And three, the interaction between humans and machines.  
As an offshoot of engineering ethics, a major concern for robot ethicists is with developing robots 
that follow an acceptable set of rules (Abney 2012). Deciding on what constitutes these acceptable set of 
rules is subject to debate, as with many ethical issues. Nevertheless, it is important to raise these concerns6. 
It becomes appropriate to question the type of design, ethical limits, malevolent use, possible side effects, 
and the appropriate age to engage with these intelligence systems. As Bostrom & Yudkowsky note, the 
primary aim of robot ethics should be to ensure that artificial intelligence systems operate in ways that 
guarantee the safety of humans (2012). In this way, robot ethics can be seen, in a sense, as ethics for 
robotics (Boddington 2017).  
As would be expected, different scholars have their perception of what they think robot ethics 
entails. For Peter Asaro, when we speak of robot ethics three possible meanings are elicited (2006). First, 
we mean the ethical behaviours on our part that are triggered through and with the use of robots. Second, 
we question how best to design robots to act ethically and debate on the possibility of robots being ethical 
agents. Third, we consider the human-machine interaction and all its appurtenances (Asaro 2006, 9). I will 
briefly touch on the first and third classifications mentioned by Asaro in the course of this section, as they 
fit best into my delineation of the primary concerns of robot ethics. It is, however, expedient to state that 
the distinction of robot ethics from machine ethics that I have chosen places Asaro’s second classification, 
robots as ethical agents, within the ambit of machine ethics.  
                                                          
6 In much of the literature, Asmivo is unarguably seen as a forerunner in the development of guidelines to regulate the 






Malle & Scheutz put forward two questions that, they argue, fall under robot ethics; these are 
ethical questions about designing, uses, and abuses of robots and questions about the moral capacities of 
robots (2014). For my delineation, I situate questions on uses, abuses and design of robots as concerns of 
robot ethics. Questions about the moral capacities of robots fit best within machine ethics.  
The first concern of robot ethics is to ensure that the design, process, creation, and purpose of 
artificial intelligence systems are ethical. AIS must be created such that they are beneficial to humans 
(Floridi, Cowls, Beltrametti, Chatila, Chazerand, Dignum, and Schafe 2018). When we create artificial 
intelligence systems, our aim is always to meet a need, solve a problem, or improve our efficiency and 
accuracy in a particular task. It becomes counter-intuitive if the ethical burden this supposed improvement 
brings outweighs its benefits. The implication is that creating a robot or AIS must be deliberate and well-
intentioned. On the other hand, the challenge remains that we cannot properly regulate the creation of 
these systems yet since anyone with the requisite skills can build a robot in her garage without a licence. 
Hence, regulating this practice remains a hurdle to be crossed. Although we may fall short of ensuring 
proper regulation of the creation of AI systems, robot ethics nevertheless focuses on how best to create 
these systems and in turn regulate their use.  
The question of design also encompasses the problem of algorithmic bias. During the process of 
data mining and analysis, certain unaccounted biases are embedded, which is often referred to as 
‘algorithmic biases’ (Bozdag 2013). Algorithmic biases are implicit biases that are often unintentional yet 
embedded in intelligence systems, whether they are autonomous or not, in a way that affects value 
judgements and reinforce inequality, stereotypes, and partiality (Hajian, Bonchi and Castillo  2016; Danks 
and London 2017). If we consider that one of the central reasons for building artificial intelligence systems 
is to avoid such biases in the first place, then having algorithmic biases becomes a serious ethical issue 
requiring closure.  
The second concern of robot ethics is with the issue of rights. By this I mean, the duties of 






rights?’ (Coeckelbergh 2010). As absurd as this question may sound perhaps, works of literature abound of 
ethicists making a defence for or against robot rights in much the same way we speak of animal rights 
(Bryson 2010). When rights are being discussed in this sense, attention is not just on the legal rights of 
robots. Instead, the focus is on the moral rights robot may have or possess. This is usually because rights 
as a legal concept are often grounded on moral justifications. This may include, as Hohfeld says, privileges, 
claims, powers, and immunities (1919). One of the reasons we are inclined to have this type of 
conversation is that our designs of robots have been anthropomorphised. Hence, we see them as 
extensions of ourselves.  
However, as we edge closer to having a fully autonomous AI, the case for robot rights become 
more compelling. As Dashevsky (2017) points out, the European Parliament’s legal affairs committee 
considers the idea of “electronic personhood” a substantial basis to accord advanced AI some rights. 
Joanna Bryson (2010) rejects this perspective, arguing that granting robots rights in some ways 
dehumanises humans by emboldening poor decision-making, which is caused by the abdication of 
responsibilities and transferring it to robots.  
In addition to this, robot ethicists are also concerned with whether the designs of artificial 
intelligence systems encroach on human rights. This is quite different from the first cluster of issues; the 
idea here is the rights of robots weighed up against the rights of humans. With the vicissitude of real-world 
ethical conundrums, when robots carry out their duties, there is a need to examine at the design stage when 
human rights and those we may accord to robots clash. The clash of rights between humans and machines 
is usually hypothesised in such a way that priority is given to humans over machines.  
The third concern of robot ethics is with human-machine interactions. Recent researches in robot 
ethics have been focused on caregiving robots for children, the disabled, elderly, and the role and morality 
of sex robots. The emphasis here is on the possible ethical burden this may bear on human interaction 
largely because activities such as caregiving and sex require some level of intimacy, delicacy, and 






can be drawn concerning their deployment? With the possibility that we might have robots play a 
significant role in the future, such as caregiving, do they need to possess features like emotions to act 
morally or would they require a strictly rule-based system to act as such (Coeckelbergh 2010)?  
There are, however, some pros to having robots as caregivers. One, their judgment will not be 
impaired or strained by stress like human caregivers. Two, robots tend to be a hundred per cent available 
to carry out their duties – no bathroom breaks needed. Three, even though arguable, some care is better 
than no care at all. These, amongst many other reasons, show the positive value of automating care 
practice. However, ethicists like Sparrow and Sparrow (2006) argue that using care robots could be 
unethical. Their reasons are not farfetched. The dignity of the recipient of care is challenged by this 
deliberate outsourcing. Feelings of objectification and loneliness can be overwhelming if the human touch 
is elusive.  
Another aspect of care robots stealthily addressed in the ethics of AI is robot companionship. By 
this, I refer to sex robots and other such artefacts not used in the same sense we speak of care robots for 
the elderly or disabled. Herein, the focus of robot ethics is with the state of relationship, value, and moral 
consequence interaction with sex robots may have on the recipient (Ramey, 2005), as well as the adverse 
effects it may have on other humans (Danaher, J., 2017; Turkle 2006). Several questions arise when 
engaging in this conversation, such as the range of features should affective robots possess. Can we make a 
morally defensible case for sex robots? How can erotic AI be created with ethical limitations to respect 
emotionally vulnerable individuals? Considering that humans tend to build an emotional bond with 
creatures outside their species, such as animals, roboticists are challenged to ensure their creations do not 
exploit these affective aspects of users (Sullins 2012). Hence, robots that mimic functional and affective 









1.2. Machine Ethics  
Machine ethics, as a subarea of the ethics of AI, is often referred to as one of the following: 
computational ethics, machine morality, moral machines, artificial morality, safe AI, or friendly AI. The 
term is credited to Mitchell Waldrop (1987), who in his article titled ‘A Question of Responsibility’ called 
for a theory of machine ethics.  
Machine ethics refers to ethical concerns as they relate to autonomous intelligent systems (Goodall 
2014). In machine ethics, these systems are the subject of ethical debates. In other words, intelligent 
systems are not seen as mere artefacts but as possible new intake into our moral community and one that 
might have a profound impact on our legal, ethical, social, and economic landscape (Torrance, 2013). 
Each of the appellations for machine ethics (computational ethics, machine morality, moral 
machines, artificial morality, safe AI, or friendly AI) gets used differently, they are broadly construed as 
referring to the subfield of the ethics of AI different from robot ethics. Friendly AI is used to describe how 
we may build friendly artificial intelligence systems that are smarter and faster in performing cognitive tasks 
(Boyles and Joaquin 2019; Wallach & Asaro 2017). Safe AI, on the other hand, describes the safety of 
robots, especially in making decisions of moral consequence (Rodd 1995). Machine ethics is used to 
identify an aspect of the ethics of AI concerned with how machines might make ethical decisions 
(Anderson, Anderson and Armen 2005) and more importantly, how and when machines might be 
considered ethical agents (Muller, 2019). Machine morality and moral machines are not used differently 
from machine ethics.  
There are four primary themes in machine ethics. One, projects that focus on how we might 
programme artificial intelligence systems to be ethical (Leben 2018; Arnold and Scheutz 2016). Two, 
projects that focus on the moral behaviour or decision-making process of artificial intelligence systems 
(Leben 2017; Dietrich, M and Weisswange 2019; Van de Voort, Pieters and Consoli 2015). Three, projects 
that focus on the question of artificial moral agency (Grodzinsky, Miller and Wolf 2008; McDermott 2008). 






understanding of artificial moral agency (Gamez 2008; Chella and Manzotti 2009; Starzyk and Prasad 2011; 
Clowes, Torrance and Chrisley 2007). In a way, all four subprojects of machine ethics are inter-related. I 
will offer an analysis of each of these primary areas of machine ethics later in this section.  
Machine, as used here, does not refer to just any piece of mechanical equipment used for a specific 
function or task; rather, it refers to a higher-order and complex equipment, gadget, artefact or algorithm 
that is capable of carrying out tasks independent of humans. In other words, much like those described as 
robots above, these are autonomous systems. Whereas the term ‘machines’ could be used to describe many 
forms of mechanical equipment used in factories and the likes, they are not to be construed as what is 
meant by machines when discussions of autonomous intelligent systems are carried out in the sphere of 
machine ethics7.  
To appreciate the project of machine ethics, we have to consider the categories of moral agents. 
For Moor, these are, “ethical impact agents, implicit ethical agents, explicit ethical agents, and full ethical 
agents” (2006, 15-18). Ethical impact agents refer to those artificial agents capable of having good or bad, 
praiseworthy or blameworthy consequences like the desktop printer referred to above. The ethical 
concerns here are on the potential impact these agents may have by their use or misuse.  
Implicit ethical agents are intelligent agents designed with built-in safety, ethics, and security, such 
as a point of sale (POS) machine or an automated teller machine (ATM). These systems are designed in 
such a way that they request security codes before use, thereby protecting accounts of users and dispensing 
or debiting the requested amount – no more, no less. Moor argues that just as there are ethical implicit 
agents, there are also unethical implicit agents (2009), such as computer viruses designed for malevolent 
use.  
                                                          
7 We might consider, for instance, a desktop printer as a machine but it is uniquely different from a self-driving car, which 
can also be said to be a machine. The difference here is the degree of autonomy of these systems and the attendant moral 
burden they carry. The actions of the printer may have a moral impact; an example is if it is used to print documents for 
whistleblowing activities. On the other hand, a self-driving car appears to carry a greater ethical burden because it is active 
in the moral decision-making process. As Lumbreras (2017) mentions, the goal of machine ethics is ultimately to ‘endow’ 
self-governing systems with ethical comportments. In the case above, a desktop printer would not count as ‘self-governing’ 







In contrast, an explicit ethical agent refers to artificial intelligence systems “able to calculate the 
best action in ethical dilemmas using ethical principles” (Anderson and Anderson 2007, 15) and 
independent of human actors during this process. Self-driving cars and care robots can be said to fit into 
this category of artificial agents.  
Full ethical agents possess qualities such as can be ascribed to human agents. Much like explicit 
ethical agents, they can make independent moral judgements but also often exhibit metaphysical qualities 
like intentionality, consciousness, free will, empathy etc. As I write this paper, there are no known artificial 
full ethical agents; rather development is ongoing to develop explicit ethical agents complex enough to give 
us an insight on what full ethical agents might look like. Full artificial ethical agents can be said to be 
autonomous if they can operate independently of a “human mediator” (Chopra and White 2011, 2) in their 
decision-making process and could rightly be held accountable for their decisions.  
Asaro in his article “What Should We Want From a Robot Ethic?” identifies five categories of 
ethical agents. These are amoral robots, robots with moral significance, robots with moral intelligence, 
robots with dynamic moral intelligence, and full autonomous moral agents (2006). Asaro’s categorisations 
are not very different from Moor’s who offers four categories of moral agents8.  
For Floridi and Sanders (2004) we classify an artificial intelligence system as an agent depending on 
its level of abstraction (LoA henceforth). LoA helps to set a framework of reference when referring to a 
concept, subject, or definition in mathematics, logic, science, and even human interaction. In other words, 
“…abstraction acts as a ‘hidden parameter’ behind exact definitions, making a crucial difference” (Floridi 
and Sanders, 2004: 4).  
Quite obviously, systems that are explicit in design, or according to Asaro’s classification, systems 
with moral intelligence, all possess certain features. Floridi and Sanders argue that these features are 
                                                          
8 Putting Moor’s alongside Asaro’s classification, amoral agents are those I have identified as ethical impact agents. Systems 
with moral significance are represented as implicit moral agents. Explicit moral agents are systems with dynamic moral 
intelligence that can make moral decisions while employing moral principles explicitly. The final type of moral agent 







indicative that these systems have attained certain levels of abstraction that we may consider qualifying 
enough for a moral agent, at least in a remote sense. These criteria/features include autonomy, 
interactivity, and adaptability9. 
Systems embedded with moral intelligence or systems we consider explicit moral agents meet the 
first and second criteria, which are interactivity and autonomy. The basis for their moral intelligence is to 
autonomously make moral decisions in response to external stimuli. The third criterion, which is 
adaptability, is a characteristic feature of systems with dynamic moral intelligence and full moral agents. 
With advances in deep learning, explicit moral agents soon become agents with dynamic moral intelligence; 
as they interact with their environment and acquire more data, they begin to adjust their underlying moral 
framework.  
For artificial explicit ethical agents, their autonomy arises not only from their seeming ability to 
“work without human supervision” (Chopra 2010, 38) or to make independent moral decisions alone, but 
from their ability to adapt to their environment, optimise efficiency, and make sound judgements from an 
array of ethical possibilities. 
For now, machine ethicists are concerned with addressing ethical issues that apply to explicit or 
dynamic moral agents. Generally, the project of machine ethics focuses on how best we might ground 
ethical decisions of machines or robots on normative ethical principles. Unlike robot ethics, machine ethics 
focuses more on embedding ethics into autonomous intelligent systems to allow them to make ethical 
decisions. Below, I give an extensive analysis of the four themes of machine ethics.  
                                                          
9 In explicating the importance of these criteria, Floridi and Sanders note: “(a) Interactivity means that the agent and its 
environment (can) act upon each other… (b) Autonomy means that the agent is able to change state without direct 
response to interaction: it can perform internal transitions to change its state. So an agent must have at least two states. 
This property imbues an agent with a certain degree of complexity and decoupled-ness from its environment. (c) 
Adaptability means that the agent’s interactions (can) change the transition rules by which it changes state. This property 
ensures that an agent might be viewed, at the given LoA, as learning its own mode of operation in a way, which depends 







Firstly, in building AI systems that are beneficial to us, as is the concern of robot ethics, we must 
investigate how best to programme them10. By programming these systems, I mean embedding an ethical 
principle or a moral code into these systems (Floridi and Sanders 2004; Wallach, Franklin and Allen 2010; 
Lin, Abney and Bekey 2012). The obvious challenge this poses is that we are inundated with several ethical 
theories. This is because in ethics we not only account for right or wrong actions, we also account for 
permissible actions. The disparities amongst ethical theories make it quite a daunting task to embed ethics 
or a moral code into artificial intelligence systems (Allen, Varner and Zinser 2000). Furthermore, ethical 
theories are not universally applicable, as what is true in one instance may not be in another, which implies 
that at least at some level, ethics is laced with subjectivity (Brundage 2014). For this reason, not many 
ethical theorises have been applied to autonomous intelligent systems. Particular emphasis has been placed 
on Kantianism (Powers 2006), utilitarianism (Grau 2006; Faulhaber, Dittmer, Blind, Wächter, Timm, 
Sütfeld and König 2019) as versions of deontological and consequentialist ethics, respectively. Quite 
recently, there have been attempts at developing a virtuous robot, patterned after the ethical principle of 
virtue ethics (Danielson 2002). 
Secondly, machine ethicists are tasked with identifying the moral behaviour or decision-making 
process of these intelligent systems (Moor, 2006). The project of programming artificial intelligence 
systems to act ethically requires some features. These include what Wendell and Allen (2012) calls ‘the 
framing problem’. Simply put, the framing problem is the challenge of teaching machines how to identify 
ethically significant situations. That is the “ability of AIS to recognise ethically significant situations [and] 
human ethical concerns into selecting safe, appropriate, and moral courses of action” (Wallach and Asaro 
2017). Wallach, Franklin, and Allen (2010) observe that accounting for how autonomous systems may 
                                                          
10 In answering the question of how to go about the embedding of ethical principles into AIS, it behoves machine ethicists 
to decide on the best approaches to use. So far, three approaches standout, top-down, bottom-up and hybrid. In the top-
down approach, an ethical principle is selected and applied in a theoretical form to the AIS using a rule-based method such 
as Asimov’s three laws of robots (Allen, Smit, and Wallach 2005). The bottom-up approach, on the other hand, does not 
refer to any particular ethical principle; instead, through machine learning, these intelligent systems can learn subsets of 
ethical principles and over time integrate these into a whole and possibly unique ethical system (Wallach and Allen 2008). 







factor in moral consideration into their decision-making process is what gave rise to machine ethics. As 
Torrance avers, “Machine ethics deals with the ways in which human-made devices might perform actions 
that have ethical significance” (2008, 495). This aspect of machine ethics touches on developing the 
decision-making framework of artificial intelligence systems.   
Thirdly, machine ethics is concerned with the question of artificial moral agency (Allen, Varner, 
and Zinser 2000). Earlier, I had mentioned that machine ethicists do not think of machines as mere objects 
in discussions on AI but as subjects of this debate; Boyles (2018) argues that machine ethicists consider 
intelligent systems as possible moral agents. Machine ethicists are preoccupied with questioning when we 
might have and what possible criteria might make an artificial agent a moral agent. The obvious indication 
is that we do not want these systems built without some form of an ethical framework that respects human 
considerations (Abney 2012; Floridi and Sanders 2004; Johnson 2004; Moor 2006).  
By artificial moral agency (AMA), machine ethicists are referring to the ability of a self-governing 
intelligent system to make moral judgements based on its notion of right and wrong (Johnson and Miller 
2008). Perhaps the major drawback with this project is with the aspect of accountability. A full ethical 
agent is not only able to make moral decisions but also held accountable for such decisions (Marino and 
Tamburrini 2006). This does not seem to be the case with artificial moral agents. This frontier, developing 
artificial moral agents, is important in the advancement of debates in robot ethics such as the rights of 
robots.  
The fourth concern of machine ethics, which is closely linked with the discussions on artificial 
moral agency, is addressing the computational possibility of consciousness. Herein, the desire is to theorise 
how to build complex explicit ethical systems or full ethical systems. Although as I write this, complex 
explicit ethical agents do not yet exist, and neither do artificial full ethical agents, researchers are 
increasingly interested in building these sort of systems. One of the important frontiers to be crossed here 
is with accounting for consciousness (Chella and Manzotti 2009; Starzyk and Prasad 2011). Questions 






serves the purpose of addressing what might indeed constitute a moral agent and if it is at all possible to 
have AIS become full moral agents that can be accountable for their actions (McDermott 2007; Reggia 
2013). 
 
2. Why Computational Ethics 
In this section, I make the case that using the tag ‘machine ethics’ is too broad and glosses over 
very important aspects of the ethics of AI that the term ‘computational ethics’ best describes. In other 
words, it groups specific technical areas under an otherwise distinct field. I show that the subject of inquiry 
of computational ethics is of great value and indeed is an important frontier in developing ethical 
autonomous intelligent systems. More so, I offer justifications showing that computational ethics goes 
beyond the theoretical limitations of machine ethics and gives a prima facie description of actualising the 
project of building ethical intelligence systems.  
Defining computational ethics appears to be a rather easy task. Simply put, computational ethics is 
the project of computing ethics (Anderson, Anderson & Armen 2006). In other words, it is the subject of 
inquiry focused on actualising how artificial intelligence systems might make ethical decisions (Moor 1995). 
The overarching theme of computational ethics, as the name implies, is with stripping ethics of 
complexities and making it computable (Aaby 2005). In addition, computational ethics is concerned with 
the computational complexities required to build intelligent systems to make ethical decisions, as well as 
what might constitute the computational threshold to consider these systems as ethical artificial agents 
(Howard, & Muntean, 2016: 222).  
 Indeed, little work has been done on computational ethics and it is often conflated with machine 
ethics as much of its focus overlaps with machine ethics; in fact, some authors use both terms (machine 
ethics & computational ethics) interchangeably (Yampolskiy 2013; Allen, Wallach and Smit 2006). Even 
though much of the literature on the ethics of AI does not argue that machine ethics is distinct from 






infer that the term ‘computational ethics’ possesses some technical and practical edge that machine ethics 
does not seem to convey. Computational ethics, which goes beyond the debates in machine ethics to its 
actual implementation, should play a more strategic role in the ethics of AI if we are to actualise the desire 
to build ethical autonomous systems.  
Although usage of the term ‘machine ethics’ is very common in the literature, works that use 
‘computational ethics’ are quite infrequent. Most of the authors who have opted for the use of the tag 
‘computational ethics’ do not approach it as a less technical subject. Largely, researchers within the 
computer sciences, information systems, and engineering have commonly used ‘computational ethics’ in 
their attempt to explain the discipline focused on practical steps to embedding ethics into intelligent 
systems (Moor 1995; Lokhorst 2011). I hypothesise that the reason most AI ethicists have been 
unmotivated to use the appellation ‘computational ethics’ is that the label is perceived to rid the project of 
much philosophical baggage, hosting it in the domain of a practical discipline.  
Unlike the sobriquet machine ethics, computational ethics put ethicists to task, ensuring that they 
not only discuss possible ethical theories that may be applied to AI, but also that they actively engage in the 
process of creating ethical algorithms or procedures. In other words, when we speak of computational 
ethics, we do not expect a deeply abstract endeavour riddled with philosophical jargons. The aim, rather, is 
to apply critical and practical models to ethical principles by maintaining logical consistency. This does not 
mean that we should understand computational ethics as a non-philosophical endeavour; it should rather 
be seen as a more practical way of applying ethics to artificial intelligence. Furthermore, it should be seen 
as a field resident in the intersection between ethics and other scientific disciplines focused on AI research 
and development such as knowledge representation and reason, computation, embodiment and logic.  
It is important to identify what computational ethics is and what it is not in more detail. This is 
because there are possible ways the subject of computational ethics might be misconstrued. I will identify 







Perhaps the most likely field of research that may easily be conflated with computational ethics is 
computer ethics. Computer ethics is an aspect of applied ethics that deals with the ethical issues that 
surround the use of computers and other computing technologies (Forester & Morrison, 1991). Some have 
defined it as the subject of inquiry that deals with the ethical conduct and behaviours of professionals in 
the computer and information technology fields (Anderson, 1992; Bynum, 2001). James Moor refers to it 
as the “analysis of the nature and social impact of computer technology and the corresponding formulation 
and justification of policies for the ethical use of such technology” (1985, 266). Debates around computer 
ethics focus on “privacy, property rights, accountability, and social value” (Johnson, 2004:65), 
cybersecurity, data usage etc. Also, normative theories are usually applied to extant ethical issues in 
computer ethics, giving it a philosophical feel (van den Hoven, 2010; Tavani, 2002).  
As shown above, computer ethics varies distinctly from computational ethics. Whereas the former 
deals with conducts that regulate professionals and the use of computer technologies within the field, the 
latter focuses on how best to create ethically aligned artificial intelligence systems. The former is about 
ethical guidelines and the latter is about practical steps to codifying ethics.  
Another important concern of computational ethicists is with developing the decision-making 
architecture of artificial intelligence systems. Even though machine ethicists study and hypothesise how 
AIS should make ethical decisions, the computational ethicist is tasked with developing a program to make 
this possible. The framework for ethical judgements and the logical and computational implications of this 
is put to test by the computational ethicist. To achieve this, decision-making algorithms are designed and 
tested; counterfactuals and ‘try and except’ conditions are also put to test to ensure a robust ethical system 
is deployed for use. This process also involves scenario planning and testing that goes beyond the armchair 
thought experiments that machine ethicists engage with.  
As extensive work continues to go into developing decision-making algorithms for ethical AIS, the 
question of agency comes into play. Arguably, as many ethical theories dictate, rationality is a key factor for 






for that make computational rationality possible. This means that it must engage with other fields such as 
neuroscience, cognitive science, game theory, and economics (Lewis, Howes and Singh 2014; Gershman, 
Horvitz and Tenenbaum 2015). Ethics has become a recent add on because the conversation of building 
complex autonomous intelligent systems that are sensitive to human values has become central to the 
conversation.  
The subject of computational rationality addresses two important aspects; these are the decision-
making processes in artificial intelligence systems, as well as the development of artificial moral agents 
(Bongani, 2020). Looking closely, it is apparent that computational ethics fuses these two concerns. What 
computational ethicists do is to attempt to create systems complex enough to meet the threshold in which 
they may be considered as computationally rational. This could mean hardwired programming of open 
source robots and experimentation to see if they meet the criterion of computational rationality set by 
machine ethicists. This is important because rationality is an important criterion for moral agency.  
Following the conversations on computational rationality is the pursuit to explore computational 
consciousness in robots/machines. Lokhorst (2011) notes, that the study of a robot/machine’s ability to 
contemplate its reasoning is situated in the field of computational meta-ethics. Artificial consciousness, as 
it is mostly called, is a budding area in AI that has significant implications for the ethics of AI (Chella & 
Manzotti, 2013; Cardon, 2006). For this reason, computational ethicists are concerned with the possibility 
and experimentation of computational consciousness. They do this with the understanding that the subject 
of consciousness might influence our understanding of the agency and patiency of artificial intelligence 
systems, and how we may build them. And ultimately, this could translate to the ascription of rights and 
privileges in society.  
My advocacy for the recognition and entrenchment of computational ethics as a subset of the 
ethics of AI is not for pedantic satisfaction; it is strategic for the project it sets out to fulfil, which is the 
development of ethical intelligence systems. This is because computational ethicists develop formal 






ignored is the fact that computational ethicists develop algorithms for decision making that align with one 
or more ethical principles. As humans, we analyse all available data before making a judgement; in some 
instances, like the classic trolley problem, we may decide to pull the lever and let the trolley run over one 
person to save five. In another, we prefer not to have a hand in pushing a hypothetical ‘fat man’ off the 
bridge to save five lives. This sort of moral ambivalence is what computational ethicists contend with, 
seeking ways to translate abstract moral principles into computer codes.  
 
3. Some Distinctions: Robot, Machine, and Computational Ethics  
A taxonomical mapping of the ethics of AI is important so we can situate research within this area 
appropriately and also foster collaborations across seemingly unrelated disciplines. From the above analysis 
of robot, machine, and computational ethics, there are obvious contrasts and overlaps, which should not 
be ignored. In this section, I succinctly show these contrasts and where these overlaps occur, giving 
insights to why I believe all three interconnected subareas play important roles in the ethics of AI.  
As discussed in the previous section, the thematic focus of robot ethics is three-fold. First, it 
focuses on ensuring that the design, creation, and purpose of artificial intelligence systems are ethical. In 
addressing this issue, questions about autonomous weapons systems (AWS) come to mind with some 
ethicists suggesting that AWS should be banned entirely on grounds of their purpose not being ethical 
(Sauer, 2016; Asaro 2012). Second, it focuses on how rights may conflict if we include AIS to our moral 
circle. Herein, the goal is to show justifications to accept or reject the proposition that robots should be 
entitled to moral rights. The third focus is on the impact of human-machine interactions. As we become 
heavily dependent on AIS and automate several aspects of our lives, we are faced with unique sets of issues 
that challenge our ethical convictions and paradigm. Herein, questions about the moral consequences of 
care and sex robots on humans seem to be the top issues.   
On the other hand, the thematic concern of machine ethics is four-fold. Firstly, projects that focus 






ethical theories that can be best applied. Secondly, projects that focus on the moral behaviour or decision-
making process of artificial intelligence systems. An example of questions asked here would include, how 
should a utilitarian self-driving car act in a moral conundrum? Thirdly, projects that focus on the 
possibilities and improbability of artificial moral agency. Can we ever have systems we can consider moral 
agents in the same sense we speak of humans? Answers to this question may rest heavily on how we 
respond to the question of moral responsibility and accountability. Fourthly, projects focused on the 
nature of computational consciousness and how this may influence our understanding of artificial moral 
agency. The engagement with the problem here is largely theoretical.  
Even though the concerns of machine ethics do appear to significantly overlap with those of 
computational ethics, the former only sets the theoretical foundation upon which practical computational 
techniques are built for application. On the other hand, the latter is more concerned with testing these 
hypotheses. Can we have artificial intelligence systems that meet a minimum threshold for which we can 
consider them computationally rational? To find answers to this, we must go beyond armchair analysis to 
actual experimentation of these ideas.  
Computational ethics also seeks to simulate consciousness in AI. With this, we can have more 
evidence to point us towards the possibility that artificial consciousness is possible. Asimov’s I, Robot 
gives us a fictional look at what it would be like to have a robot that achieved consciousness. In the story, 
that robot was able to defy and override the programming of VIKI (Asimov, 1950).  
On the overlap, for one, robot ethics questions the design and purpose of artificial intelligence 
systems. In other words, it shows the moral justification of having ethical compliant robots. On the other 
hand, machine ethics focuses on how we might go about programming these systems to ground the 
justifications raised by robot ethics. Computational ethicists then take all these into account to build such a 
system.  
Two, robot ethics concern with human-machine interaction and attendant ethical issues that may 






artificial intelligence systems and the effect of these processes and consequent decision on the interaction 
between man and machine. Computational ethicists, being aware of these ethical concerns and possible 
suggestions, develop ethically grounded algorithms and codes to be able to execute them during 
simulations and tests.  
Three, overlapping the debate on rights, which is central to robot ethics, machine ethics focuses on 
debates about what qualifies an entity as a moral agent. This is because, for the rights of robots to be 
grounded, they first must be seen, to a degree, as moral agents. This means that the project of 
computational consciousness, which is situated in the domain of machine ethics, is instructive to how we 
proceed with discussions on artificial personhood and artificial agency. On the other hand, we cannot talk 
about artificial moral agency if we are unable to build them. This is where computational ethicists come in; 









A - Robot Ethics
B - Machine Ethics 
C - Computational Ethics
 
Fig 1 – This Venn diagram highlights the subareas in the ethics of AI, showing the logical relations among 
robot ethics, machines ethics, and computational ethics. It draws attention to the overlaps and contrast of 






1. Elements in A, B & C - The subject of moral agency overlaps among the three subareas. For robot ethics, it is 
inquiries about the rights of robots; for machine ethics, debates on what qualifies an entity as a moral agent; 
while computational ethics seeks to build systems that can be considered moral agents.  
2. Elements in A & B - The subject of human-machine relations overlap between robot ethics and machine 
ethics. Robot ethics considers this from the point of safety, while machine ethics considers it from the point of 
ethical behaviours of AIS.  
3. Elements in B & C - The subject of computational rationality & consciousness is studied by both machine 
ethics and computational ethics.  
4. Elements in A not in B or C - The question of the ethical implications of design and purpose of creating 
intelligent systems is a subject of robot ethics not considered by either machine or computational ethics.   
5. Elements in B not in A or C - Machine ethics studies how ethical principles can be applied to artificial 
intelligence systems. The focus here is to question the suitability of ethical principles. This subject is not 
addressed by either robot or computational ethics.  
6. Elements in C not in A or B - Computational ethics, unlike robot or machine ethics, is heavily practical and 
seeks to program and develop robots to be ethical. It takes the theoretical work done by robot & machine 
ethicist into account in the building of ethical AIS. 
 
 
4. Computational Ethics As An Important Frontier   
In this section, I show why computational ethics is an important frontier in the attempt at 
embedding ethics into increasingly autonomous intelligent systems. I make four justifications for this 
claim, showing how AI ethicists can better engage with the projects at the heart of computational ethics. I 
contend that it is an important frontier primarily because without computational ethics we will only have 
theoretical discussions about building ethical AI. With computational ethics, we actually engage in this 
activity, programming these systems and addressing the shortcomings we confront upon their deployment.  
Having shown how computational ethics differs from machine and robot ethics, it is important to 
note that computational ethics is not just a practical dimension of machine ethics; it is also a 
transdisciplinary approach to developing intelligence systems to act ethically. A computational ethics 
approach, unlike machine ethics, is to lay technical groundworks required for the building of ethical 






principles are important. The computational ethicist would be concerned with creating the right algorithm 
that is both compliant with an ethical system and functionally dynamic to operate in the real world.  
To ground computational ethics as an important and significant frontier in the ethics of AI, four 
justifications come to mind. Firstly, unlike machine ethics and robot ethics, computational ethics boasts of 
its practical edge in actualising the goal of its project. It raises practical questions on the plausibility and, 
more importantly, the tractability of ethical principles as they apply to autonomous intelligent systems 
(Brundage 2014). As I have argued above, computational ethics put to task the desire to move beyond 
simple debates of methods to implementation. 
Computational ethicists have shown significantly that ‘moral codes’ can be embedded in intelligent 
systems, even though it is a very difficult project to embark on. This is not some theoretical attempt at 
discussing the impact of human interaction with intelligent systems but rather a pursuit to actualise the 
project of making ethical artificial intelligence systems. By actualising its project, I mean it queries which 
ethical principle might stand out as computable; in fact, computational ethicists have demonstrated this 
practical edge by collaborating with computer scientists and engineers to develop AIS that are responsive 
and, at the very least, sensitive to ethical theories in their interaction with humans and other morally 
significant beings (Anderson and Anderson 2007).  
Secondly, computational ethicists have shown optimism in their work to have ethically sensitive 
self-driving cars and care robots. In their attempt to do this, they address some of the questions not 
typically asked by robot ethicists such as how might we make ethics tractable (Brundage 2014)? Can we 
address the framing problem, in other words, can we design intelligent systems that can identify morally 
significant situations (Wallach and Allen 2012)? How do we address the problem of moral uncertainty and 
probability (Shachter, Kanal, Henrion, and Lemmer 2017)? Can we have a moral justification of an action 
irrespective of its unintended consequences? To fully address these questions, computational ethics has to 
be experimental and procedural. It not only suggests ways in which answers may be given to these 






Simulation modelling is one way this can be carried out, which simply, for a theorist, is a transition from 
thought experiments to creating these experiments with computerised logical and mathematical tools 
(Chung 2003).  
Thirdly, in cases where it is largely evident that an ethical principle is not calculable or possess non-
procedural features, computational ethicists are tasked with designing an analytic framework to validate the 
usefulness of these principles. In other words, tapping into the resource of knowledge representation and 
reasoning (KRR), computational ethicists develop the semantic and syntactic functions required to 
represent these abstract ethical principles in forms that are computable for artificial intelligence systems 
(Levesque 1986). For example, if we have an ethical principle that dictates that “right acts are acts that 
cause the least harm”, the computational ethicists must be able to deconstruct and unpack the concept of 
‘least harm’, stating what the AI should consider ‘least harm’ in all ramification.  
Fourthly, computational ethics is a transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary project. Aspects of 
computational ethics cross disciplinary boundaries. And this is important if we have to develop ethical AIS. 
In Fig 2 below, I show, using a schematic diagram, how computational ethics interacts with other 
disciplines in the study of AI. Even though ethics serves as the core of the subject of computational ethics, 
it is heavily dependent on logic to attain a formal structure. On the other hand, representing ethics within 
appropriate and computable syntax and semantics would require the tools used in knowledge 
representation and reasoning (KRR) to unpack the meanings of abstract words and concept (Baral and 
Gelfond 1994). The possibility of having a transdisciplinary relationship among ethics, logic, KRR makes 
the project of computing ethics a little more tractable than it is in abstract form.  
Furthermore, in the attempt to build ethically responsible AI that fall into the category some would 






embodiment, often grouped under robotics, is an important part of computational ethics (Parthmore & 
Whitby, 2014)11.  
 
  
Fig 2: This shows the interaction of key disciplines in the formation of computational ethics. Although ethics stands as the 
core subject of computational ethics, from the diagram above, its formalisation is dependent on logic, computing, and 
knowledge representation and reasoning. Further actualisation is dependent on robotics/embodiment.  
 
Arriving at the kind of conception of computational ethics I have suggested above would greatly 
improve the quest to build ethically sensitive artificial intelligence; in fact, it allows taking an experimental 
approach to ethical theories that would prove efficient in testing its usefulness when applied to AI. A 
proclivity toward this thinking prompted Ruvinsky to sees computational ethics as, 
…the integration of computer simulation and ethics theory. More specifically, 
computational ethics is an agent-based simulation mechanism that takes a 
computational perspective to ethics theory. This approach uses computer modelling 
and multiagent systems to generate societies of agents capable of adopting various 
ethical principles. The principle adopted by an agent will dictate its moral action in 
response to a moral dilemma. By simulating the agents’ application of ethical principles 
                                                          
11 Parthmore and Whitby make a strong case for why embodiment constitutes an important aspect in the project to build 
artificial moral agents. This is because embodiment appeals to the human tendency to relate and nurture, and does so 
regardless of the form these systems come in – biological or synthetic. Usually, we tend to care for things we 

















to moral dilemmas and observing the resulting moral landscape of a group of affected 
agents, we are better able to understand the social consequences of individual ethical 
actions’ (2007: 1).  
 
Ruvinsky’s description offers insight into the ultimate evolution of computational ethics. In essence, 
the project moves beyond simply suggesting ethical principles to govern the operations of artificial 
intelligence systems and requires an in-depth understanding of computing. Ultimately, AI ethicists engaged 
with computational ethics would have to adopt procedural techniques required to compute commands into 
intelligent systems. A fair knowledge of machine learning becomes important in designing and applying 
appropriate ethical frameworks to intelligent systems.  
One major objection to my proposal is that the belief that computational ethics, as I have identified 
it, is no different from what computer scientists and robot ethicists are currently doing. It is not that 
simplistic; computational ethics, as I have described, requires a rich knowledge of ethics, one that perhaps 
only a moral philosopher can share. With a grounding in ethics, computational ethicists would require 
some understanding of knowledge representation and reasoning (KRR), which could further strengthen 
the ethical frameworks AIS are built on.  
AI ethicists ought not to see computational ethics the same way they see machine ethics. The 
difference bears on the practicality of the former over the later. The obvious implication of this is that we 
can access better insight into what is tenable and what is not if we put our hypothesis to test. AI ethicists 
are to understand robot and machine ethics as the first and second frontier in discussions on developing 
ethically compliant AIS; computational ethics then becomes the critical missing piece we need.  
 
Conclusion 
In this essay, I have provided an extensive and analytic distinction among the subareas of the 
ethics of AI – robot, machine, and computational ethics. More so, I have shown contrasts and overlaps 
among these disciplines, highlighting the key roles they play in achieving the goal of the discipline – ethics 






Discussions about the moral justification of creating intelligent systems, the socio-ethical and 
socio-economic impact that human-machine interaction may have on society, the possible conflict of 
human and robot rights, and debates on the moral status of artificial intelligence systems, I have argued are 
important issues in the ethics of AI and particularly robot and machine ethics. On the other hand, attempts 
at programming ethics into AI systems, building an artificial moral agent, simulating consciousness in 
machines fall under computational ethics.  
In this essay, I have offered a four-pronged justification as to why the ‘computational ethics’ 
presents a prima facie description of the project of embedding ethics in artificial intelligence systems. I 
have also argued that computational ethics should be seen as a separate subfield of inquiry but as an 
‘important frontier’ in the ethics of AI. As a uniquely practical way of applying ethics to AI, computational 
ethics fuses relevant disciplines like computing, KRR, ethics, logic and embodiment to actualise its goal of 
building ethical intelligent systems. Doing computational ethics as I have nudged would mean that moral 
philosophers would become inclined to engage ethics in quantificational forms. So far, in the literature, 
many ethicists are disinclined to approach the ethics of AI this way; I have shown that it remains an 
expedient exercise in computational ethics.  
Lastly, there are two ways to consider my recommendations on the import of computational ethics 
to the ethics of AI. One way is to embrace it as an instructive piece and encourage collaboration among 
ethicists, roboticists, and computer scientists. The other is to reject it, which would imply that we continue 
to work in silos, each to her/his own. I prescribe the first option, as moral philosophers are often better 
equipped at understanding the normative aspects of ethical theories. This level of appreciation of ethics 
allows moral philosophers to be experts at laying the theoretic foundation upon which the computer 
scientists and roboticists can begin experimentation. At the same time, it affords computer scientists 
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